The Pirates of Somalia

Long after most people forget about the tragic final voyage of the Tanit—a small yacht that had been sailed by a young French captain—I shall remember the fact that a young child has become an orphan, and his mother has become a widow, as a result of the violent confrontation between a small band of Somali pirates and members of an elite French Special Forces unit. Three men had lost their lives in the exchange of machine gun fire on the apparently cramped deck of the small yacht.

Florent Lemaçon, the captain of the Tanit, and two members of the pirate gang had lost their lives as a consequence of a military operation that was over less than six minutes after it had begun. Fear and confusion must have reined supreme, during those fatal six minutes, as the French military stormed the yacht. Death now stalks the luminous waters of the Indian Ocean. The curious phenomenon of Somali based piracy is certainly well established at the present time, and, it would seem everyone is familiar with the rules of the game now.

The stakes are high, and there seems to be reluctance—on the part of the pirates themselves—to put an end to this dangerous, albeit lucrative industry. A few days after the tragic death of Mr. Lemaçon, the world learned of the dramatic freeing of Richard Phillips, the captain of the Mearsk Alabama, a vessel that had been attacked by the pirates in international waters five days previously. Mr. Phillips, no doubt, owes his life to the professionalism and sharp shooting of the United States Navy—and especially to the men of the elite Navy Sea, Air, and Land Forces.

In reality, the pirates who had been holding Mr. Phillips had very little chance of achieving their stated aims with respect to winning a ransom payment for the release of their hostage. Having been taken captive, after a failed attempt to hijack his American flagged vessel, Mr. Phillips had spent five days and four nights drifting gently at sea on one of the Mearsk Alabama’s lifeboats. Mr. Phillips had demonstrated considerable bravery in volunteering to go with the pirates on condition that they leave his crew unharmed. Yet despite the well-known tranquillity of the Indian Ocean, it is easy to imagine the anguish that had been felt by Mr. Phillips during his time in captivity on that lifeboat.

It is not difficult to imagine the fear and dread being felt by his loved ones in America, as his life was in the balance on what seems like an empty sea. It is obvious now, with the benefit of hindsight, that this particular group of pirates were doomed from the very beginning. These men must have known—as they desperately attempted to reach the Somali coast—that there was, in reality, little chance of them escaping death, or lengthy imprisonment, as a result of their actions. Fate had not been kind to this group of pirates when they had failed to hijack the Mearsk Alabama. With the benefit of hindsight, it is quite obvious that the United States Navy is a truly formidable adversary for any group of armed thugs, not least a small band of young and desperate Somali pirates.

The greatest strength—and the most potent bargaining device—available to the Pirates of Somalia is their ability to take an entire ship, and its crew, and hold such an asset until they are paid a ransom for the release of such maritime capital. Any deviation from this pirate modus operandi greatly increases the risks for both the pirates and their hostages. The risk associated with death as a result of pirate raids, and the risk associated with military confrontations at sea, are well understood by the Pirates of Somalia. The fact of the matter is that there are plenty of young men willing to strike it rich by becoming maritime bandits. Furthermore, the family of the fallen are always looked after by their kinsmen. This phenomenon can best be described as traditional Somali social security with a maritime twist.

It must be remembered that the majority of the Pirates of Somalia are former fishermen. These men have been forced to give up their former means of production as a result of often violent, and wholly illegal, encroachment on Somali fishing grounds by foreign fishing vessels. Hundreds of mainly European fishing vessels are in the process of looting Somali territorial waters, and the Somalis have limited options with respect to protecting their legitimate fishing rights. It is little wonder that many Somali men turn to the business of holding foreign ships for ransom. This activity has become the only viable means of production left for the men who live in many of the coastal settlements of Somalia.

Piracy has become big business in North-eastern Somalia, and this situation is not likely to alter significantly in the foreseeable future. Yet there is more to Somalia than the organised crime of industrial piracy on the high seas. There is more to the Somali nation then mere banditry. It is precisely this reason why the Somali people deserve better than the periodic repeat of military scenarios inside the Somali national territory where the highly trained—and well resourced—Special Forces of advanced nation states attack and kill the best of Somali youth. It is the responsibility of all Somali people to mend the broken political structures that have brought us to this regrettable situation at the present time.

So long as there exists a political vacuum inside Somalia, the Pirates of Somalia shall continue to go about there business undisturbed. Indeed, the so-called transitional federal government of the Somali Republic—an entity that is recognised by the United Nations—actually empowers the Pirates of Somalia, by its very nature. It is no secret that the current President of Somalia, and entire council of ministers, are perceived as a bunch of venal money-grabbers by a majority of the Somali people. By contrast, the Pirates of Somalia are perceived—by and large—as honourable maritime entrepreneurs, and captains of Somali industry.

It is quite clear to me that Somali society must find a new group of political leaders. The Somali nation desperately needs leaders that are able to confront both the Pirates of Somalia and the scourge of illegal foreign fishing inside Somali territorial waters. Only with the rise of responsible national leadership is the phenomenon of Somali based piracy adequately countered. The tragic death of Mr. Lemaçon, and the utterly senseless deaths of several young Somali men should, in ideal circumstances, be the last we ever hear of in relation to the work of pirates. However, I fear that the future—in all likelihood—is one filled with ever more daring examples of Somali piracy on the open seas.